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The Appropriateness of Violence: The Non-Rational Logic of Terrorism 
Kevin Kulig 
 The goal of this essay is to introduce the logic of appropriateness to the strategic model 
that dominates terrorism studies and show how the former versus the latter can more accurately 
model terrorists' decision making process. The strategic model overlooks the potential 
descriptive and explanatory power of normative and cultural, i.e. "non-rational" factors by virtue 
of its assumption of rationality. Moreover, the model has seen little empirical testing, and when it 
has, it fails to sufficiently explain terrorism (Abrahms 2012, 2006). This paper imports an 
alternative model for terrorism, building off the logic of appropriateness from international 
relations theory, in an attempt to capture the logic underlying the basic, fundamental motivations 
of terrorists. Applying this model best describes the terrorists' initial decision to use violence, but 
the logic of consequence best describes how the terrorists carry out violence action. I conclude 
by noting the increased explanatory potential for theories of terrorism when both logics are 
included and with discussing new research directions based on my findings.    
 The goal of the paper is to raise the question "Where do norms, culture, and identity of 
terrorists fit into their decision to use terrorism?" This paper means to see how applicable the 
logic of appropriateness is to a particular "moment" of this phenomenon, not to fully explain how 
terrorism comes to be. What follows suggests that 1.) the logic of consequence ill fits the entire 
logic of the terrorists, 2.) the logic of appropriateness better fits a part of their logic, and 3.) the 
two logics together form the basis for explaining why, how, when, where, and against whom 
terrorism occurs. The logic of appropriateness determines the extent to which terrorists follow 
3 
 
the logic of consequence. It establishes a "general outline" of action, and the logic of 
consequence fills in the details, so to speak.
1
  
 In order to test for the presence or absence of the logic of  appropriateness, I examine 
terrorists' statements, loosely defined as any communication or message from a terrorist or 
terrorist group intended for an external audience. These statements come in a variety of forms, 
such as declarations, videos, books, and even court testimony. And on this point, I introduce my 
other goal, perhaps more normative than strictly analytical: we should give terrorism back to the 
terrorists. To clarify this: If the meaning and definition we ascribe to it were purely meant to be 
an abstract, analytically useful concept for scholarship and policy, I would have no problem. 
However, when we define and explain terrorism according to our unknown or known biases for 
political, cultural, or personal purposes, we analyze our terrorism, not the terrorism of the 
terrorists.  To do this, we must take what terrorists say about their terrorism seriously by viewing 
it in light of their culture, norms, and language, and not automatically assuming that they do not 
mean or believe what they say. The problem is when we  instead impose on analyses and theories 
our assumed views of how we believe all people function without checking to see if they actually 
help in explaining or describing terrorism.  
 The paper is structured into eight sections. Section I describes the logic of consequence, 
as it is used in theories of terrorism, and the logic of appropriateness, as it may apply to 
terrorism.  Section II critiques two prominent theories of terrorism which use the strategic model 
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 An illustration would do well here to explain: Suppose a person of a certain culture makes a libation on joyous 
occasions. As the description stands, it is fairly vague, leaving open various questions such as what liquids are 
acceptable for a libation, where and when must it be made, what should be worn during the libation, etc. To the 
extent that these are left open, the person making the libation decides the answers to these and so is able to act on the 
logic of consequences for these specifics so as to avoid unnecessary inconveniences. Depending on their wealth, 
they may use cheap liquids if poor and more expensive ones if rich. They may perform it in convenient locations and 
at convenient times. If the rules were more detailed, specifying a certain type of wine made only from certain 
grapes, or specifying that the libation must be poured at precisely a certain time, then it has fewer details for the 
logic of consequences to fill in, since the logic of appropriateness has already done so. 
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to illustrate how their assumptions affect their analyses and then briefly looks at two theories 
which feature a more structural explanation of terrorism, but do not exactly apply the logic of 
appropriateness. Section III discusses the definition of terrorism I use and describes the selection 
criteria for my cases. The next four sections (IV-VII) are the cases themselves: al-Qāʿidah, the 
7/7/2004 London subway bombers, the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI),  and Revolutionary Organization 
17 November (17N). Each case will examine statements from each group for evidence indicating 
the logic of appropriateness and ends with a visual summary of the analysis. The final section, 
VIII, summarizes the findings of the cases and discusses future research avenues.  
I. The Two Different Logics of Action 
 The strategic (Abrahms 2008) or instrumental (Crenshaw 1988) model of terrorism has 
enjoyed immense popularity among academics and policy makers alike. This model, based on 
the more general model of rational actors, is predicated on three main assumptions: “(1) terrorists 
are motivated by relatively stable and consistent political preferences; (2) terrorists evaluate the 
expected political payoffs of their available options, or at least the most obvious ones; and (3) 
terrorism is adopted when the expected political return is superior to those of alternative options” 
(Abrahms 2008, p. 79). It assumes that terrorists follow the "logic of consequence": terrorist 
understand the effectiveness of their methods vis-à-vis other methods for achieving their political 
goals, and are expected to abandon them when alternative methods become more effective (ibid., 
p. 81).  However, this model has seen limited empirical testing, and so has not actually been 
validated (ibid., p. 79).
2
  
 Actors following the logic of appropriateness, alternatively, “maintain a repertoire of 
roles and identities, each providing rules of appropriate behavior in situations for which they are 
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relevant” (March and Olsen 2006, p. 690). For this logic, actors match their situations and 
identities to the appropriate rules and norms, rather than calculate potential probabilities and 
payoffs, in order to determine their actions (ibid.). These rules and norms are “institutionalized 
practices of a collectivity, based on mutual, and often tacit understandings of what is true, 
reasonable, natural, right, and good” (ibid.), transmitted through social networks, and can change 
through new experiences and social contact (ibid., p. 697). Actors will ask themselves “What 
kind of situation is this? What kind of a person am I? What does a person such as I do in a 
situation such as this?” (ibid., p. 690).  
 Terrorists adhering to this logic would be motivated by their situations and identities and 
act according to the rules their situations and identities prescribe.  We should expect to see the 
reasoning for terrorist attacks be based on matching those elements together and ascertaining the 
similarity between established rules, identities, and norms to current situations, not calculations 
about the effectiveness of those attacks in furthering material or political goals.  Their 
fundamental, basic motivations and reasons cannot be reduced to political preferences and 
payoffs. Their identities, or how they view their identities in their situations, instead constitute 
their most basic motivations. For them, violence is not merely a strategic tactic for achieving 
material/political goals, but a self-evident, inevitable action, intrinsic to their situation. Though it 
may seem strange to call violence a norm, “rules of appropriateness underlie atrocities of action 
[….] The fact that a rule of action is defined as appropriate […] does not guarantee technical 
efficiency or moral acceptability” (ibid.). Additionally, we should not automatically presume that 
their violence is a calculated action to maximize political or material payoffs.  
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 There exist some tests of this model, namely Dying to Win  and Cutting the Fuse (Pape 2005, and Feldman 2010) 
and Dying to Kill (Bloom 2005), but these studies have only focused on suicide terrorism. Further, their conclusions 
are contested and contradict each other.   
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 If terrorists do follow the logic of appropriateness instead of the logic of consequences, 
we should find evidence of this in their statements, which expound their reasons, grievances, 
intentions, and motivations for their actions. Generally speaking, their statements should show: 
1.) references to or acknowledgement of  their identity, situation, and rules 2.) a process of 
matching these together, or more loosely, some type of interplay between some or all of these 
elements 3.) a cognitive framework or culturally/normatively based structure in which all these 
elements are situated and matched together, and finally 4.) language of necessity with regard to 
their actions, such that their actions had to happen, or, that those actions are integral, constitutive 
features of their identity, situation, and rules. Indeed, the examination of their statements bears 
out that these guidelines roughly capture the content of terrorist statements.  
II. Critique of the Strategic Model 
 Kydd and Walter's “The Strategies of Terrorism” (2006) is an application of costly 
signaling from game theory to terrorism.
 3
 They define terrorism as "the use of violence against 
civilians by non-state actors to attain political goals" (p. 52). Terrorism operates according to 
five costly signaling strategies: attrition, intimidation, provocation, spoiling, and outbidding. 
They note that terrorism has also had five relatively stable goals over time: regime change, 
territorial change, policy change, social control, and status quo maintenance. Regime change is 
simply the overthrow of a government, territorial change is the transfer of land from one country 
to another (including the establishment of a new country on that territory), policy change are 
lesser political demands, like supporting or not supporting a country, social control seeks to 
constrain behavior of individuals, and status quo maintenance supports an existing regime 
against internal or external challengers. A terrorist organization need not be limited to only 
holding one goal.  
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 Costly signaling, they contend, is a method of reducing uncertainty and of statements 
pertaining to power, resolve, and trustworthiness between two parties who expect each other to 
be mutually dishonest. Talk alone is cheap, and so liars can easily use it. Consequently, for 
communication to be taken seriously, a cost must paid which liars or bluffers would be unwilling 
or unable to make. Because terrorists need to provide credible information to their audiences 
(including states, foreign populations, and domestic populations), they cannot use cheap talk. 
When terrorists attempt to credibly convey the topics of uncertainty (power, resolve, 
trustworthiness) to the recipient(s) (enemy, domestic population), they use the five 
aforementioned costly signaling strategies.  
 Before outlining the specific strategies below, I will point out the assumptions of the 
strategic model which are apparent in how they set up their theory. Stable goals may be read as 
analogous to motivations or possibly even identity and/or rules, though this is a rough analogy. 
Actors are motivated by their goals or the maximal achievement of their goals (i.e. "highest 
payoff"). These goals have a material (or, political) basis as well, meaning that they can be traced 
back to territory, policy, or behaviors and so may be said to deal with inherently negotiable 
matters. These political goals are assumed to be understood by the target too. By extension, if 
terrorists’ goals are not (or non-) negotiable, then the strategic model is of dubious application. 
Once the target infers that the message sent is credible and not cheap talk, then the terrorists will 
cease to use costly signaling. Likewise, according to the underlying assumptions, they will cease 
to use violence for costly signaling, or costly signaling altogether, when other strategies 
supersede it, or when it is ineffective (e.g., the target does not understand that the terrorists are 
communicating a specific message). Their preferences though, not actions, are fixed, the latter of 
which may be highly fluid depending on how the conditions and their calculations change. 
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 In my summary of their argument, I do not include the counterterrorism strategies they propose. 
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Notice the difference with the logic of appropriateness, which would stipulate that the actions are 
fixed once situation, identity, and rules have been matched. Those latter elements can be fluid 
and dynamic at least until the actor is reasonably sure of a suitable match between them.  
On another point, this theory assumes that terrorists desire to communicate through 
violence resolve, power, or trustworthiness in hopes that it changes their target’s behavior. This 
entails three further assumptions: 1.) terrorists’ primary goal is to influence behavior, 2.) the 
purpose of their violence is to communicate information about their status, capabilities, or 
features, and 3.) their “verbal statements are often not credible” (p. 57). We must ignore other 
possible purposes for their violence and throw out what they say solely on the assumption that 
their “real” and credible communication is their violence.  
 I have summarized and broken down the authors' costly signaling strategies (taken from 
pp. 59-78) in Table 1 below to explicate how they  follow the assumptions of the strategic model: 
Table 1: Summary of “The Strategies of Terrorism” 
Costly Signaling 
Strategy 
Elements of the Strategic Model 
Stable Preferences Highest Payoff Conditions 
Target Audience Terrorist Group 
Attrition: Convince 
target of their superior 
power and unyielding 
resolve    
Minimize future costs of 
continuing conflict 
Territorial 
change 
Target government cannot retaliate 
with proper force and have little 
interest in the conflict, target has 
past behavior of giving 
concessions when under pressure.  
Intimidation: 
Demonstrate that 
terrorists can punish 
those who disobey 
and that the state 
cannot stop them  
Support the actor who is 
less  costly to support 
Social control, 
regime change 
Weak state, rough terrain.  
Provocation: Persuade 
domestic audience 
that target of attacks is 
evil and must be 
resisted 
Resist evil governments 
and support those who 
fight against them 
 
 
Regime 
change, 
territorial  
change 
Target government retaliates 
brutally and/or indiscriminately, 
audience can influence target 
government’s behavior 
Spoiling: Persuades 
target government that 
moderates from 
Avoid negotiating with 
extremists/untrustworthy 
parties 
Territorial 
change, 
achieving best 
Lack of self-policing of terrorist 
group, peace negotiations  
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terrorist group cannot 
be trusted  
possible 
concessions 
Outbidding: Persuade 
domestic audience 
that terrorist group 
best supports 
audience’s interests 
by carrying out 
increased/more 
destructive attacks 
Support group which 
will achieve best 
possible concessions 
despite high costs, avoid 
supporting sellout 
groups 
Achieve best 
possible 
concessions, 
diminish 
influence of 
sellout groups 
Multiple groups competing for 
domestic audience’s support, 
uncertainty among domestic 
audience about terrorist groups’ 
and foreign adversary’s 
trustworthiness 
 
 The greatest problems this theory runs into is that terrorist groups consistently and 
frequently commit violent acts, both of which contradict the core assumptions of the theory. If 
violent acts are meant to be costly, then they should not happen frequently due to their high 
costs. And if terroristic violence is ineffective at achieving concessions, terrorists should not be 
using it consistently. The rational model's assumptions do not allow for this theoretical model to  
accurately explain observable reality, and in fact the observations contradict the results we would 
expect from this model. True, the model can make additional assumptions to explain this 
behavior, for example, that terrorists are highly cost tolerant/immune. In that case, why even 
posit that terrorism is costly signaling if the terrorists do not value their methods as being costly? 
Attempts to harmonize observations with theory involve adding these sorts of undermining 
assumptions. If the observations support that the terrorists consistently fulfill obey certain rules 
in certain situations when they have a certain identity, then the logic of appropriateness would fit 
much easier than the logic of consequence with ad hoc or contradictory assumptions. I am not 
saying that the logic of appropriateness would specifically solve this problem, only that if the 
assumptions of rationality are proving problematic and inconsistent with their observable 
implications, then different ones may be needed.  
 By excluding norms and culture, the onus of explanation and description falls on the 
assumptions of rationality. Norms and culture, however, capture a part of the phenomenon that 
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the rational model, by virtue of its assumptions, cannot. For example, it can show for the 
outbidding strategy that these groups are not competing at all, but just acting out certain roles. In 
the latter case, the costly signaling theory would, at best, fail to give any "real" insights into the 
causes of terrorism, and at worst, prescribe disastrous policy actions which exacerbate the 
situation even more. A theory which assumes non-rationality and a logic of appropriateness, 
however, would be able to explain how these roles come about and relate to each other, and offer 
policy recommendations aimed at changing the roles of certain actors or possibly altering how 
the actors perceive those roles so that violence does not come about. Those normative and 
cultural aspects, however, are not even considered under the rational model, despite that they 
may in fact offer grounds for better theory and policy recommendations.  
 Robert Pape's theory, developed in Dying to Win (2005) and Cutting the Fuse (and 
Feldman 2010), develops a theory of suicide terrorism and sketches the logics behind it. He 
defines terrorism as "the use of violence by an organization other than a national government to 
intimidate or frighten a target audience  [….] [and] has two broad purposes: to gain supporters 
and to coerce opponents" (2005, p. 3). Terrorism follows a strategic logic, best summarized with 
Pape’s own words: 
At its core, suicide terrorism is a strategy of coercion, a means to compel 
a target government to change policy. The central logic of this strategy is 
simple: suicide terrorism attempts to inflict enough pain on the opposing 
society to overwhelm its interest in resisting the terrorists’ demands, and 
so to induce the government to concede, or the population to revolt 
against the government. The common feature of all suicide terrorist 
campaigns is that they inflict punishment on the opposing society, either 
directly by killing civilians or indirectly by killing military personnel in 
circumstances that cannot lead to meaningful battlefield victory. As we 
shall see, suicide terrorism is rarely a onetime event, but often occurs in a 
series of suicide attacks. It generates coercive leverage both from the 
immediate panic associated with each attack and from the risk of 
punishment of innocents in the future (pp. 19-20).  
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Further, there is a specific logic of coercion followed by weak actors. Normally, coercion 
is used by stronger actors against weaker ones, but in the case of terrorism this order is reversed. 
States would use two types of coercive strategies: punishment and denial. Denial requires 
significantly greater military capabilities than terrorists possess, and so punishment is the only 
option. Suicide terrorism, by imposing costs on civilians and the military and threatening future 
costs, thus follows the same logic used by states (cf. WWII bombings of Dresden, 1972 bombing 
in Vietnam, and the first Gulf War).   
 The ultimate goal and consistent motivator for suicide bombing, in nearly all instances, is 
the liberation of militarily occupied territory and freedom for the terrorists' homeland is the 
common and consistent motivator for carrying out suicide terrorism. Their policy goals are 
actually in line with moderate nationalists’ goals, they simply differ on how they see the 
effectiveness of violence vis-à-vis other methods, especially against democracies. And so, after 
Pape examines the success record of Hamas and Hezbollah, he concludes that indeed suicide 
terrorism scores some victories, albeit "modest or very limited goals, [and] so far [suicide 
terrorism] fail[s] to compel target democracies to abandon goals central to national wealth or 
security" (ibid., p. 12).  
  Pape's argument, resting on the stability of terrorists’ goals and their picking the optimal 
strategy, relies heavily on the rational model. The goals that inspire suicide terrorism are both 
highly stable and highly political (material): suicide terrorists wish to end a military occupation 
of a territory in their homeland. Viewing the terrorists' goal this way, though, obfuscates 
potential normative factors motivating their actions. Just because the material reflection of these 
notions takes the form of ending a military occupation does not mean that the military 
occupation itself is the actual motivator. This material reflection may be useful as a proxy, but it 
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cannot tell us much about what, if any, cultural and normative influences underlie it. Granted, in 
the case that there is a 1:1 correspondence between the material and the ideational, then 
understanding the norms behind the material is unnecessary. However, it is precisely my point 
here that the rational model heavily disincentivizes, or even forbids, examining those immaterial 
factors. Peering beyond the material into the ideas and non-rational structures can reveal patterns 
lying beneath it, giving rise to more generalizable and explanatory theories. Alternatively, we 
may look and see that the specific combinations of identity, situation, and rules bear no 
influence, i.e., the normative/culture explanations are idiosyncratic and patternless, and territorial 
occupation by a foreign power is indeed the only shared pattern. We cannot say anything on this 
matter, though, until we make an effort to discern any patterns, or lack thereof, and understand 
which ones lead to which material reflections.   
He also greatly stresses that suicide terrorism is the most optimal choice from the 
perspective of the terrorists, but in doing so he makes a circular argument. Suicide terrorism 
achieves limited concessions against democracies, but not limited enough for it to be a failure. 
His theory fulfills the requirement of weighing other choices by then arguing that terrorists 
recognize suicide terrorism is better suited than guerrilla or insurgent tactics when facing 
democracies. Problematically, there is a lack of evidence for comparison of the suicide terrorism 
strategy to other violent strategies, let alone non-violent ones. This is exemplified by the theory’s 
circular reasoning: Suicide terrorists use suicide terrorism because it works best, and if it didn't 
work best they'd used other methods, ergo it works best. Simplified more, suicide terrorism 
works best because other methods don't, and other methods don't work best because suicide 
terrorism does. I do not mean to set up a straw man of his argument, but because he selects cases 
on the dependent variable only (Ashworth et al. 2008, p. 273), it is possible to construct his 
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argument as such. This circular reasoning leads me to suspect that non-rational logics are 
operating under the hood, as it were, leading to a logical fallacy when a strictly rational model is 
applied to it. If the suicide terrorists choose suicidal violence because they have deemed it 
appropriate based on their situation, identity, and rules, then a circular argument does not arise. 
However, that method of determining action is not in accord with the rational model, and so it 
cannot be used.  
 The analysis of these two rational/strategic model theories demonstrate a few pitfalls of 
purely assuming a logic of consequence among terrorists and tentatively suggests how the logic 
of appropriateness may avoid them. Perhaps the most glaring problem are their internal failings 
and inconsistencies.  Kydd and Walter's costly signaling theory lacks a reconciliation between 
the low costs terrorists seem to pay for their signals due to their frequency and the high costs 
necessary for these signals to be costly and also between the consistency of their actions and 
those actions' apparent ineffectiveness at persuading the target or credibly communicating 
information. Pape's foreign occupation theory of suicide terrorism relies on circular reasoning for 
the effectiveness of suicide terrorism. These alone do not warrant a rejection of the rational 
model, but nonetheless they are potential indications that its assumptions are fundamentally 
flawed, since the explanations resting on them fail to correspond to our observations and data.  
The added value of the logic of appropriateness for theories becomes greater when, in addition to 
potentially avoiding observational and logical inconsistencies, it can reveal generalizable 
patterns of thought, based on normative and cultural values, leading to terroristic violence 
obscured by their material manifestations. For a hypothetical example, suicide terrorism 
specifically happen when actors weigh the situation more heavily than identity or rules in the 
matching process, or perhaps they start thinking of their situation first then link it to their identity 
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and rules, etc. But because this mode of determining action is non-rational, the logic of 
consequence cannot broach these types of explanations, and may thus fail to uncover better 
explanations. Both theories examined exclusively privileged the material situation because their 
assumptions focus on tangible payoffs.  
 Other critiques of theories based on the rational/strategic model have pointed out further, 
more detailed inconsistencies with the data. The coercive effects of terrorism have been largely 
ineffective, and "research fails to identify a single terrorist organization that has achieved its 
political platform by attacking civilians" (Abrahms 2008, p. 83) and those that have been 
successful were guerrilla campaigns directed at military targets, not civilian ones (ibid.). If the 
terrorists were rational actors, they would have stopped using this method. Another point 
indicating a problem with the coercive logic of terrorism is that many terrorist groups rarely 
claim responsibility for an attack. These anonymous attacks, and the failure to issue a demand 
associated with them, goes against the coercive logic of terrorism (ibid., pp. 89-90). If no 
demand is associated with the violence, it does not qualify as coercion. Another critique is that 
terrorism is a first, not last, resort. However, terrorists have political options available and attack 
societies which have the greatest number of these alternatives available (ibid., p. 84). Of course, 
this in itself does not violate the evaluation of available methods requirement of the rational 
model, for it leaves open the possibility that terrorists have examined other methods but chose 
terrorism. But, it without a study that includes evidence of such evaluation this argument still 
holds. Related to the last point, terrorists rarely, if ever, compromise, despite that doing so would 
satisfy a large portion of the demands (ibid., p. 86) and that issues are almost always divisible 
given their complexity and the ability to make side payments (ibid., p. 87). That they seem to 
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ignore or refuse political options in favor of violence weakens the applicability of the rational 
model.  
   The final two points criticize terrorism's fulfillment of the stable and consistent goals 
requirement. The political platforms of terrorist groups often vacillate wildly, leading to no 
consistently cited reason for carrying out attacks. The ETA switched from fighting the Franco 
dictatorship to the new democratic government and the PKK changes its stance from advocating 
a homeland governed by Islamic, Marxist, or neither (ibid., pp. 181-182). Finally, the fratricidal 
nature of some terrorist organizations' attacks (ibid., pp. 90-91) confuses the true nature of their 
goals. That is, it questions whether they are fighting a political fight against a foreign enemy or if 
they are simply fighting for supremacy among their own community.
4
  
  These additional criticisms underscore lack of empirical correspondence for explanations 
using strategic model, bolstering the suggestion that its assumptions are flawed for characterizing 
terrorists' actions. Again though, these criticisms by themselves do not immediately suggest that 
the logic of appropriateness fits better. However, I believe Pape in his own theory unintentionally 
raises the possibility of the logic of appropriateness when he states that suicide terrorists wish to 
“punish” their targets. He of course does not intend its deterrence/coercion meaning, but this 
word also unavoidably evokes normative connotations, e.g. someone must be punished because 
they did something bad, or someone must be punished for the sake of justice. Punishment can 
occur because it is appropriate and not because it leads to higher future payoffs. Certainly there 
are other parts of the logic of appropriateness still missing, but it importantly hints at the 
existence of this logic despite assumptions to the contrary.  
                                                 
4
 For the sake of fairness, I will point out that these critiques themselves have been critiqued. See, "Correspondence: 
What Makes Terrorists Tick" International Security, Vol. 33, No. 4 (Spring 2009).  
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 Of special, but brief, mention are the theories of terrorism which have opted for "non-
rational," normative-cultural explanations. In "Market Civilization and its Clash with Terror" 
(Mousseau 2002/2003), the author points out that terrorism most commonly occurs in societies 
with clientalist economies when they come into contact with the capitalistic mores of Western 
societies. Capitalist economies stress the individual and the use of contracts to enforce economic 
exchange and legal matters, replacing the function of and thus clashing with the strong societal 
bonds among small groups. The breakdown of clientalist linkages leads to chaos in society as it 
transitions to a capitalist economy. Terrorism arises when in-groups fight to preserve the 
clientalist ways, viewing all out-groups as outsiders or enemies, and thus making them valid 
targets for violence. Another study, "Behind the Curve: Globalization and International 
Terrorism" (Kurth Cronin 2002/2003) names globalization as a major factor in the rise of 
terrorism. When Western values threaten to replace deeply held values in non-Western societies, 
terrorism surfaces to assert a counter identity and fight against the cultural homogeneity of 
globalization. Finally, in "Terror as Transnational Advocacy" (Asal et al. 2007), the authors 
highlight the similarities between terrorist groups and transnational advocacy networks. Terrorist 
organizations very often use many non-violent methods, such as issue linking, symbolic politics, 
and establishing information networks, which TANs also employ. The difference is that terrorist 
groups use violence as well. Their study crucially connects terrorists organizations to non-violent 
social movements, the common link being that both wish to change normative values. Lastly, 
“Terrorism, Signaling, and Suicide Attack” (Hoffman and McCormick 2004) has applied the 
logic of appropriateness to terrorism,
 
but only to explain why  some individuals become suicide 
bombers in groups. The logic of consequence applies to the terrorist group as a "whole," by 
which he mainly means the leadership. In fact, the logic of appropriateness, or at least the social 
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norms associated with it, seems to function as the leadership's "control mechanism" for non-elite 
members.  
 The central argument of this paper complements the above theories in some sense, but 
differs from them fundamentally on the level of analysis and purpose. The first two theories 
propose entirely structural arguments for why terrorism occurs without exploring the 
assumptions which form their foundation. In this way, this paper complements them by offering 
a (potential) basis to test them, or at least develop the micro-level effects of macro-level 
phenomena. In the same way, the argument here is a sort of precursor to the third article, at least 
insofar as TANs use symbolic politics and issue linking—it would be difficult to imagine purely 
rational descriptions of how those work. For the last article, my argument differs in that the logic 
of appropriateness applies to all types of terrorism, not suicide terrorism exclusively, and also to 
the group as a whole, not only individuals in it. I also mark the dividing line, as it were, between 
the two logics much differently. The leadership and regular members use both logics, not one or 
the other exclusively, and switch depending on the specificity of the rules of their logic of 
appropriateness.  
III. Definitions and Selection Criteria 
 I will only briefly talk here about the definitions of terrorism and the one this essay 
adopts. The problem of defining terrorism has been discussed countless times (see, for example, 
Jongman and Schmid 1988 and Laqueur 1999), and indeed a definition greatly affects which 
groups are chosen, how they are examined, and what theories are crafted, but for my purposes, 
this issue is largely irrelevant. I look for disparities between what the terrorists (as so named by 
others) say about their motivations and what empirical research on terrorism says about them. 
Consequently, I select groups which have been classified as terrorist by those theories. 
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Terrorism, for the purposes of this essay, is defined by how others apply the term, not by any 
intrinsic features of the phenomenon it denotes. Though this is an imprecise way of defining a 
phenomenon, in light of this essay’s thesis, it is appropriate. The results of my analysis will help 
define what "motivations" are for terrorists and suggest what role they should play in definitions 
and theories of terrorism—are they a sine non qua, a variable, or irrelevant? 
 I have selected statements from al-Qāʿidah (issued by ʿUsāmah bin Lādin), the London 
7/7 bombers, Mohammed Siddique Khan and Shehzad Tanweer, the Jemaah Islamiyya (JI) 
(issued by Imam Samudra), and the now defunct Revolutionary Organization 17 November 
(17N) (issued by its former leader, Dimitri Koufodinas). These terrorists and terrorist 
organizations were chosen for several reasons, though chief among them was the availability of 
authentic statements. Statements issued by them are more readily accessible, in translation or 
original, than other terrorists or terrorist organizations.
5
 Further, the veracity of these statements 
was far more easily established due to the plethora of sources for them, such as multiple news 
reports from different agencies and academic articles. Ensuring the authenticity of the statements 
is entirely vital to the accuracy of my conclusions, for falsely ascribed statements would not 
reflect the true views of the terrorists and terrorist groups. Second, I chose terrorist groups whose 
language and/or culture I was familiar with. This was to make sure I did not overlook or ignore 
any cultural, linguistic, or textual nuances, and thus avoid misinterpreting their statements.  
 Although the above two criteria deal with factors exogenous to the features of the 
terrorist groups, the others deal with endogenous ones to enhance generalizability of my 
conclusions. I selected terrorist groups which primarily attacked civilian, rather than military, 
                                                 
5
 For example, I found statements online by Shining Path (terrorist organization in Peru) and Revolutionary Nuclei 
(terrorist group in Greece) in Spanish and Greek, respectively, but they were left un-translated.  
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targets. There is a growing awareness in the terrorism literature that guerilla organizations (i.e. 
those that avoid attacking civilians or focus on attacking military forces) are different than those 
which seek to attack civilians (see Ganor 2002, Moghadam 2006, Nolan 2002, Schmid and 
Jongman 2005, Wilkinson 1986; from Abrahms 2012, p. 369). I also selected on geographic 
location, or rather, Western and non-Western organizations, functioning as a proxy for difficult-
to-capture variables like culture or history, to see if it affected the motivations and professed 
raison d’etre of the terrorist groups. The final selection criterion I used was the religious 
affiliation of the groups.  
 The point of these criteria is to show that the logic of appropriateness is not peculiar to or 
correlated with specific characteristics, but that it is relevant for all terrorists groups. Thus, I start 
with al-Qāʿidah to show that the logic of appropriateness accurately describes the exemplar 
Islamic terrorist group, and then proceed to the London bombers to show that the logic is not 
specific to non-Western cultural factors, and then to the JI to show that non-Arab, non-Western 
Islamic groups use it as well, and finally I end with 17N to demonstrate that the logic of 
appropriateness is not specific to Islamic groups, or religious groups more generally, as it occurs 
in a Western, atheistic group. Despite only having four cases, the stark contrasts between the 
qualitative features of the groups strongly suggest that the logic of appropriateness can 
accurately characterize many other terrorist groups' decision processes as well.  
 Though it may seem odd at first to “control” my cases by letting them vary as much as 
possible, I must make two points for doing so. The first is that I am not developing a theory for 
terrorism, but only questioning the applicability of the logic of consequence to terrorist groups. 
Following from this, the second point is that I am looking for a constant, something that does not 
change or vary even if other variables do. Normally, constants are not particularly interesting 
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since they cannot describe a relationship between two variables. However, this constant will 
affect the assumptions of the strategic model, upon which many other theories are built, and if 
this constant shows that those assumptions do not hold, then theories which will upon it must be 
modified accordingly. It is a constant which affects how other variables will vary with each 
other.. To put this in other terms, I am looking for a shared variable among a type or class of 
groups, and so the sample should be representative of the entire type, not a sub-type.  
IV. First Case: al-Qāʿidah 
 al-Qāʿidah, perhaps the most infamous terrorist organization, at least in the Western 
world, will serve as my first case. By far, ʿUsāmah bin Lādin has been one of the most popular, 
perhaps most prolific too, al-Qāʿidah member for issuing statements, manifestos, fatāwā
6
, and 
letters, and the statements are taken from him. It is on account of this popularity and visibility, 
and thus ability to articulate their statements to the widest, largest audience, that I chose 
communications from them. I have arranged them in chronological order to show the stability of 
the themes and motivations in their communications. I have attempted to select those which are 
specifically addressed to their targets, but have also chosen those meant for Arabs and Muslims 
specifically. Despite these different audiences though, their proclaimed motivations do not 
change. 
 I being with “ʿilān al-jihād ʿalā al- ʾamrīkiyīn al-muḥatilīn li-bilād al-ḥaramayn” 
[Declaration of Jihad on the Americans Occupying the Country of the Two Sanctuaries, trans. 
mine],
7
 which was issued in 1996 by bin Lādin in the London based al-Quds al-ʿArabī. I choose 
                                                 
6
 Plural of fatwā, which, generally speaking, is a non-binding ruling or opinion on an issue for Muslims, based on 
Islamic law and jurisprudence and issued by a religious authority, Islamic scholar, or anyone trained in Islamic law.  
7
 Alternative translations exist for this title, such as the one given by PBS which has “Declaration of War” instead of 
“Declaration of Jihad.” That translation, though, is quite slanted as “jihād” does not mean war. Additionally, the text 
explaining this declaration says that a fatwā is “a declaration of war,” which is patently false. Source: 
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/terrorism/international/fatwa_1996.html  
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to start with this since it is the chronologically first of all the statements I include, providing a 
basis for comparing and evaluating the discourse of other similar statements. It is also the 
statement whose excerpts I have translated myself to minimize any potential biases in the pre-
existing translations. This one sets the stage, so to speak.   
 ʿUsāmah, after some Qur’anic verses, which themselves establish his identity of being a 
pious Muslim, begins the declaration by saying:  
“It is not hidden for you what in the way of tyranny, aggression, and injustice 
from the alliance of the Jews, the Christians, and their agents, befell the people 
of Islam, to the extent that the blood of the Muslims became the cheapest blood 
and their money and wealth loot for the enemies. […] The terrible pictures of 
the massacre in Qana in Lebanon are still stuck in the minds [of those who had 
seen the pictures]."
8
  
 
He goes on to list a number of other massacres occurring elsewhere, then says: 
"[That these massacres happened] is in spite of [them] having been seen and 
heard by the whole world, but rather, [they happened] by a clear conspiracy of 
America and its allies to deprive [the Muslims] weapons for the oppressed, 
under the pretext of the tyrannical United Nations.  
 
 In these opening words, he specifies the situation and elements of identity. For the 
former, he ascribes three recurring attributions to it: tyranny, aggression, and injustice. The 
primary feature of the situation is not just that Muslims (a major element of the identity bin 
Lādin matches himself to) are being attacked or having their land occupied, but the extent to 
which they are being humiliated and oppressed. The nature of this humiliation and oppression, 
according to bin Lādin, is the attacking of civilians/non-combatants who have no means to 
defend themselves—this is the most important element constituting the situation. Put in other 
terms, the bin Lādin is acting according to norms triggered when other norms and normative 
rules (here, the attacking of non-combatants and civilians) are broken or ignored. Normative 
concerns and issues constitute the situation just as much as, if not more, than the material 
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concerns. ʿUsāmah is not approaching this matter from a viewpoint of maximizing material gains 
and payoffs; there are deep rooted norms and rules which must be followed when others are 
violated.  
 The next excerpt reads: 
"We want to study mutually the ways which are possible to follow for setting 
matters right [lit. returning matters to their beginning] and returning rights to 
their holders, after what befell the people in the way of oppressive conditions 
and immense harm for matters of their religion and worldly existence, and it 
befell the people in the entirety of their groups."      
 
In this, we see bin Lādin identifying the specific issues even further. Importantly, he wants to 
"set matters right," rather than, say, improve circumstances to a point beyond "normal." The 
latter would imply the logic of a consequence at work, but the former the logic of 
appropriateness. He also talks about "returning rights to their holders," specifically bringing up 
normative issues. Of course, the "worldly existence" (That is, material things. The word he uses 
here is a semi-religious term denoting life on earth, rather than the hereafter, and is probably 
used for contrast with the word "religion" before it.) of the people is also  important, but here it is 
not meant to show that he is concerned with it for its own sake, but rather because it is tied to the 
normative issues at stake. Lastly, "the people in the entirety of their groups" expands his identity 
to not just Muslims, but Arabs (though probably Saudis here) more generally. He is trying to 
assume a variety of social identities, and thus why we will observe appeals and justifications not 
from Islam alone.  
"The situation in the land of the two Holy Places became just like a tremendous 
volcano about to explode […] and a certain explosion at Riyadh and Khobar
9
  is 
but harbinger for this surging torrent which was born from suffering, persistent 
repression, subjugation, oppressive tyranny, degrading injustice, and poverty.”  
 
                                                                                                                                                             
8
 The source for this text was taken from http://www.tawhed.ws/r?i=1502092b. All translations my own unless 
noted otherwise. I have excluded citing the original Arabic, only providing the translation. I have translated as 
closely as possible while preserving English idiom.  
9
 A reference to the terrorist attacks in those two Saudi cities in 1996.  
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 The language here indicates again that bin Lādin's motives are rooted in the situation at 
hand and that his actions are prescribed by some general rule that oppressed peoples should fight 
back against their oppressors. It is notable that here he does not draw on Islamic rules and laws 
prescribing these actions, demonstrating that he is matching himself to multiple identities, not 
just "Muslim" exclusively. It is even clearer here: 
"Indeed, our terrorism against you, while you bear arms on our land, is an order, 
legitimately obligatory by rationally demanded, and it is a legitimate right 
according to the conventions of all humankind."   
 
He cites "conventions of humankind," adding to his purely Islamic reasons for attacking the 
Americans and their allies. These appeals can be seen as attempts to evoke some sort of 
revolutionary spirit, ideal, or perhaps sympathy throughout first world countries. Such an appeal 
would resonate better than citations and listings of Islamic law among non-Arab and non-Muslim 
populations. Regardless, it is manifest that he is following rules (defending oneself) in a situation 
(being attacked or oppressed) for an identity (a human being).  
"Verily, the youth regard you as responsible for all of what killing, eviction, and 
violation of the Muslims' sanctities your brethren, the Jews, undertook in 
Palestine and Lebanon 
[…] 
And indeed, the children of Iraq and those of them who have died, more than 
600,000 on account of the lack of food and medicine, a consequence of your 
tyrannical blockade on Iraq and its people, are our children. Indeed, in that, you, 
with the Saudi regime, bear the blood of these innocents."   
 
 The issue of "responsibility" appears here, and this idea is brought up in other statements 
as well. For the terrorists, the responsibility of the target for certain offenses is an oft-seen issue 
constituting the situation. There is some norm at work here making it necessary for the offending 
party to rectify or ameliorate the situation. Were the problems caused by the "responsible" target 
the extent of the matter, then their elimination by any actor or means would satisfy the terrorists. 
However, it seems that a specific actor must be the one to deal with it or answer for it. In 
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addition to the material damages bin Lādin lists, he includes also "violation of the Muslims' 
sanctities," an immaterial, and thus suggesting normative, damage.    
 The other significant feature of this excerpt is bin Lādin's identification with the parents 
of the dead Iraqi children. Including more than just religion, his identity register encompasses 
pan-Arab nationalism and familial relationships too. Interestingly, while the situation and 
identity to which he matches himself change radically, the rules for them do not change at all. 
This hints at basic, fundamental shared characteristics among the identities and situations he 
includes, the rules for which somehow transcend them. Meaning, he is primarily motivated by 
broad, overarching norms, and the inclusion of multiple identities and situations are perhaps 
indicative of the matching process, for in doing so he refines, details, and clarifies those basal 
characteristics.   
 Quoting a poem, bin Lādin writes: 
"Walls of oppression are not demolished without downpours of bullets. 
The free do not surrender leadership to every infidel and sinner.  
Disgrace is not wiped off from the forehead without the spilling of blood."  
 
It is unclear whether bin Lādin himself wrote this, or is just quoting an anonymous author, but I 
have included this, in addition to its content, simply because it is a poem. The point is that the 
elements of the logic of appropriateness, situation (being disgraced), identity (being free), and 
rules (spilling of blood, not surrendering, and violence) are embodied in a cultural and artistic 
form of expression, suggesting that he is acting in accordance with predetermined, non-
negotiable principles.  
 Next in line is ʿUsāmah's "Message to America," a video released around November 1st, 
2004. It is exclusively addressed to America, not including any direct messages for other 
audiences, like Muslims or Arabs. Therefore, excerpts from it can show what we observed in 
"Declaration of Jihad" was not a random occurrence, but an accurate representation of a 
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consistent logic of appropriateness. The second advantage of this text is that it is specifically 
addressed to Americans. ʿUsāmah would want to make his logic understandable for a foreign 
audience unfamiliar with the situation and identity he finds himself in and norms he follows. 
This is precisely why we will see situations and identities which are non-specific to a region or 
culture. Curiously, bin Lādin's register includes more explicit overtures to a logic of consequence 
language when he addresses Americans, perhaps reflecting that they better understand or respond 
to that logic.  
 In the opening lines, and as before after introducing the message with religious language, 
bin Lādin says:  
“Before I begin, I say to you that security is an indispensable pillar of human life 
and that free men do not forfeit their security, contrary to Bush's claim that we 
hate freedom. 
 
[...] 
 
No, we fight because we are free men who don't sleep under oppression. We 
want to restore freedom to our nation, just as you lay waste to our nation. So 
shall we lay waste to yours."
10 
 
ʿUsāmah continues his logic from the previous statement regarding identity, situation, and rules. 
"Free men" (identity) "under oppression" (situation) "fight" (rule). Because he is a free man, he 
must fight, since that is what a free man does; the logic displayed by this language is a logic of 
appropriateness. In the first part of the excerpt, he expands upon the identity of a “free man,” 
someone who does not “forfeit his security,” thereby associating a rule or norm with the identity. 
Of additional note is his appeal to broader notions of human rights when he says that “security is 
an indispensable pillar of human life.” We may read this as characterizing his most basic identity 
                                                 
10
 The text for this was taken from here: http://www.aljazeera.net/news/pages/878334a3-f944-47ba-8b4f-
f9f4e957fcdd. I have not translated the Arabic statement, since English subtitles were present on the original video 
given to Al-Jazeera, (presumably) translated to English by al-Qaeda itself. For this reason, I count the English as 
being al-Qaeda's own words. 
26 
 
and norms, and also the one with the broadest appeal: a human, and therefore deserving of 
security.  
The sentences about "laying waste" to nations may be seen as a threat or coercion, but 
considering the normative aspects of bin Lādin’s statements, these lines can also express the idea 
of maintaining an equilibrium and evening of the scales, somewhat akin to revenge. The only to 
“equalize” the situation is to repay like with like, in this case, destruction with destruction solely. 
The difference between coercion/threats and revenge/equalizing  is that for the former, the 
damages can come in any form and are meant to change the behavior of the target, but for the 
latter, the damages must come in a certain form and are not intended to change behavior of the 
target. Or, in other words, the most effective means of changing the target’s behavior determines 
the damages inflicted for coercion/threats, but the type and form of damages already inflicted by 
the target determines the damages inflicted for revenge/equalizing, which is what bin Lādin 
seems to be meaning here. Cast in the language of the logic of appropriateness, the situation 
(having harm and damage inflicted) determines, or constitutes, the course of action (inflict the 
same damages and harm).  
That isn’t to say deterrence and changing behavior is not a concern, for he says a few 
lines down:  
“And as I looked at those demolished towers in Lebanon, it entered my mind 
that we should punish the oppressor in kind and that we should destroy towers in 
America in order that they taste some of what we tasted and so that they be 
deterred from killing our women and children.” 
 
Deterrence and changing behavior is still important, as bin Lādin himself states that that is the 
purpose. However, take note of why he decided to go about it the way he did and the other 
purpose of 9/11. He wanted to “punish the oppressors in kind [emphasis mine],” meaning that the 
damages were determined by the damage inflicted. More importantly, the other purpose is 
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having the Americans “taste some of what we tasted.” While ʿUsāmah touches upon the issue of 
achieving equilibrium, he has also brought up an interesting, and recurring, notion with this, 
namely that experience is requisite for understanding a situation and course of action. The 
Americans can understand only once they have experienced the reality. This hearkens back to 
what March and Olsen stated about the matching process being based on experience. In a few 
lines previous to this excerpt, bin Lādin said along similar lines:  
“I couldn't forget those moving scenes, blood and severed limbs, women and 
children sprawled everywhere. Houses destroyed along with their occupants and 
high rises demolished over their residents, rockets raining down on our home 
without mercy.  
 
The situation was like a crocodile meeting a helpless child, powerless except for 
his screams. Does the crocodile understand a conversation that doesn't include a 
weapon?” 
 
The last line is the one of key interest. The “crocodile” [America] can only understand 
“weapons,” that is, the use of violence, in the view of bin Lādin. Violence, then, is a prerequisite 
for communication with America, at least about the topic of oppression of weak foreign peoples. 
Without it, Americans are not even able to listen to and reject the conversation, since they cannot 
even comprehend it. While this is not strictly related to the logic of appropriateness, I believe this 
highlights another unrecognized aspect of the violence which may shed light upon other reasons 
why it is used. We will see other mentions of this in later statements, and I will discuss this topic 
further in the conclusion.  
 Returning to the issue of punishment, bin Lādin had said prior to the last two excerpts: 
“In those difficult moments [of viewing the effects of the war in Lebanon and 
Palestine] many hard-to-describe ideas bubbled in my soul, but in the end they 
produced an intense feeling of rejection of tyranny, and gave birth to a strong 
resolve to punish the oppressors.” 
 
He says that he had “strong resolve to punish the oppressors,” formed after viewing the 
atrocities. This would, presumably, be in addition to his other motivations and goals, e.g. helping 
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out the oppressed peoples. We should take seriously and literally his use of the word “punish,” 
and by that I mean not interpreting it as a synonym for a threat or coercion, but a obligatory, non-
substitutable penalty (in this case, infliction of harm and damages) for a transgressing a norm, 
which itself is dictated by a norm. In support of this interpretation, he declares that he decided 
the punishment was necessary based on past events; threats or coercion, on the other hand, are 
meant to influence future events. America must be “punished” (attacked) regardless of their 
future behavior and whether or not this punishment will even affect their future behavior. This 
does not support the basic logic of consequence, since bin Lādin’s idea of punishment is not 
strictly, or even mostly, for increasing future payoffs (such as, making it more likely the 
Americans will leave the Arab nations).  
 Certainly, he does include language that is in accordance with the logic of consequences 
and assumptions of the strategic model, but it is juxtaposed to and interspersed with language 
displaying the logic of appropriateness. For example, he says: 
“It is as if [the people killed in the 9/11 attacks] were telling you, the people of 
America: ‘Hold to account those who have caused us to be killed, and happy is 
he who learns from others' mistakes.’  
 
And among that which I read in their gestures is a verse of poetry. ‘Injustice 
chases its people, and how unhealthy the bed of tyranny.’ 
 
As has been said: ‘An ounce of prevention is better than a pound of cure.’” 
 
The first and last aphorisms he quotes do suggest that bin Lādin is keeping in mind future 
consequences and stopping the Americans from occupying Arab lands, but the mere fact that he 
says them aphoristically, as if they were common sense, suggests that his logic is also based on 
following norms and rules (here, in the form of aphorisms or common sense). Take note of the 
second quote, or “verse of poetry,” as well. Unlike the other two, it is far more removed from the 
language of threats and coercion, instead expressing a normative concept in the form of “poetry” 
(or perhaps more appropriately, an aphorism). The excerpt above provides a small, but 
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representative, example of how bin Lādin intertwines and mixes together the logic of 
appropriateness and logic of consequence, and also the prevalence and predominance of the 
former over the latter. Focusing on the logic of consequence alone fails to capture the nature of 
al-Qaeda’s motivations and the bases of their goals.  
 The other appearances of the logic of consequence in bin Lādin’s statements, excerpts of 
which were omitted for the sake of space, are when he discusses the details of an attack, such as 
specific location, targets, time, method, etc., basically everything besides the decision to attack—
all of those details are not governed by his logic of appropriateness, unlike the decision itself. To 
view it another way, the logic of consequences is utilized to calculate the best way to accomplish 
the course of action determined by the logic of appropriateness, but not determine that course of 
action by itself. Thus, it can explain why al-Qāʿidah used airplanes to destroy the World Trade 
Centers, but not why al-Qāʿidah even attacked the World Trade Centers in the first place.   
 To explicate the logic of appropriateness of al-Qāʿidah, I have created a visual model to 
summarize what has been stated in words above. I have only elected to include the most salient 
identity, situation, and rules for the sake of clarity:  
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Figure 1: al-Qāʿidah’s Logic of Appropriateness 
 
V. Second Case: Shehzad Tanweer and Mohammed Siddique Khan 
 Turning now to the statement’s issued by Shehzad Tanweer and Mohammed Siddique 
Khan, we shall that their statements, videos made before they carried out their attacks on the 
London subways, bear many of the same themes present in the statements issued by ʿUsāmah bin 
Lādin. Namely, the specific focus on how their situation, identity, and norms were pivotal in 
deciding to use violence. Their violence serves, among other things, to fulfill the requirements of 
appropriateness demanded by their situation (the killing, humiliation, and oppression of Muslims 
in other countries), their identity (Muslim), and their normative values/rules. It is not strictly a 
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tactical decision meant to coerce their targets into changing their behavior. This case also serves 
to show that the logic of appropriateness can apply to both Western and non-Western terrorists 
and terrorist groups.  
 Beginning his statement, Khan says:  
“Your democratically elected governments continuously perpetuate atrocities 
against my people all over the world. And your support of them makes you 
directly responsible, just as I am directly responsible for protecting and avenging 
my Muslim brothers and sisters. Until we feel security, you will be our targets. 
And until you stop the bombing, gassing, imprisonment and torture of my 
people we will not stop this fight.”
11
 
The motivation for his choice is clearly spelled out here: support for the atrocities (bombing, 
gassing, imprisonment) committed against “his” people. While he does say he will “protect” 
them, he also admits to “avenging” them as well, which is not related to any increase in security 
or protection—it is a normative, or rule-based, action. Note also his emphasis on responsibility, 
indicating that his actions are, in part, required by duty and morals, which constitute his identity 
as a “protector.” Though perhaps more obvious that his motivations do not derive from material 
consequence than the above words are these: 
“I and thousands like me are forsaking everything for what we believe. Our 
driving motivation doesn't come from tangible commodities that this world has 
to offer.” 
He freely admits that his motivation for carrying out the attack does not come from “tangible 
commodities,” i.e. material considerations. Taken with his other words, it is even more clear that 
his actions are not strictly a measures for achieving a greater payoff—they are drive by his 
normative beliefs and identity.  
 There is also evidence in his statement that his situation and identity constitute each 
other: 
                                                 
11
 Khan’s statement taken from here: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/4206800.stm 
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“And our words have no impact upon you, therefore I'm going to talk to you in a 
language that you understand. Our words are dead until we give them life with 
our blood. 
 
[…] 
 
 We are at war and I am a soldier. Now you too will taste the reality of this 
situation.” 
 
Starting with the second part, tor him, the situation is “war,” and so he is “soldier.” Because he is 
soldier, he must also “protect” and “avenge” his “people” for the sake of “security.” Moving 
back to the first portion, the situation as he puts it is one where “words have no impact,” i.e. 
communication has broken down. From this, he must “talk in a language that [his target] 
understand[s].” Though this part indicates his more immediate goals rather than basic 
motivations, I included it because it highlights that the situation, and his implied identity as a 
communicator, contributed to the actions he took. The rules associated with his identity and 
situation are his motivations for the attack, not the consequences following them. The fact that he 
must carry out the attack, not the direct consequences themselves, are more important for him. 
 These lines, in addition to what I noted above, curiously show that his violence is meant 
to alter his target’s “reality” and to give his “words life with blood.” This is important to point 
out for three reasons: 1.) it does show that the logic of consequence is at least partially at work, 
but the payoff, changing reality and giving life to his words with blood, is non-material, 2.) it 
shows that the violence is not the message itself, but a requirement for the message to be 
understood, and 3.) it has great similarity to the line in ʿUsāmah’s statement about necessity of 
violence for communication. However, since the last two points are unrelated to the current 
discussion, I will return to them later in the conclusion.  
 Evidence for matching can be found also here in his reference to Islam: 
“Our religion is Islam - obedience to the one true God, Allah, and following the 
footsteps of the final prophet and messenger Muhammad... This is how our 
ethical stances are dictated.” 
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and where he said he was “directly responsible […] for his Muslim brothers and sisters.” In no 
way do I mean to propose that Islam is responsible for, recommends, or permits terrorism, 
simply that Khan has used it to match his identity, situation, and norms. Islam, in Khan’s 
interpretation, provides the structure to link his situation (war, atrocities committed against 
Muslims) and identity (soldier, Muslim connected to other Muslims) with rules (attack those who 
are attacking other Muslims). He himself even states that this is where he derives his “ethical 
stances.”  
 Moving to Shehzad Tanweer, he states:  
“To the non-Muslims of Britain, you may wonder what you have done to 
deserve this. You are those who have voted in your government, who in turn, 
and still to this day, continue to oppress our mothers, children, brothers and 
sisters, from the east to the west, in Palestine, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Chechnya  
 
[…]  
 
Your government has openly supported the genocide of over 150,000 innocent 
Muslims in Fallujah. 
 
[…] 
 
You will never know peace until our children in Palestine, our mothers and 
sisters in Kashmir, our brothers in Iraq and Afghanistan know peace.  
 
[…] 
 
[Muslims of Britain,] [f]ight against the oppressors, the oppressive British 
regime.”
12
 
 
In this, we find the situation (oppression, “genocide,” and lack of peace for other Muslims by 
Britain) and identity (Muslim deeply connected, shown by attribution of kinship, to other 
Muslims) to which Tanweer has matched himself. His description of the situation though is more 
than just oppression, it is also the support for the oppression by British civilians. By construing it 
that way, the civilians themselves are also responsible.  He also states: 
                                                 
12
 This statement was taken from Leisure Studies: Themes and Perspectives (Best 2010) and Cutting the Fuse (Pape 
and Feldman 2010). 
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“[I]f you fail to comply with [our demands], then know that this war will never 
stop  and that we are ready to give our lives for the cause of Islam. 
 
[…] 
 
[Muslims of Britain,] [f]ight against the disbelievers, for it is an obligation made 
on you by Allah.” 
 
In these words, Tanweer specifies his situation further (war) and, with the mention of Islam, 
suggests the framework which he used to match his situation, identity, and norms. His saying 
that the “war will never stop” suggests that it is a duty or requirement, indicative more of a norm 
or a rule than a strategy. This, of course, can also be reasonably construed as coercion, but given 
the other statements examined and the lack of capability to actually coerce his target, I do not 
think coercion fits as well as a normative requirement. More conclusively, he states that this is an 
“obligation” by “Allah,” indicating that his actions are required by the rules and norms he 
follows.    
Pape’s analysis of these same transcripts concludes that these two “were motivated by the 
goal of ending foreign occupation of kindred communities” (Pape and Feldman 2010, p. 55), but 
this conclusion is not wholly warranted. The true motivation was the result their having matched 
an identity to a situation, or rather, the rules necessitated by their situation and identity, i.e. 
ending the oppression of kindred Muslims. Foreign occupation may have led to the oppression, 
but it in and of itself did not, since there could be foreign occupation without oppression, and 
likewise, oppression without foreign occupation—one does not require the other. Construing 
their motivation as “the goal of ending foreign occupation” entirely misses the point, though as 
such it does work for Pape’s theory. 
I have included a diagram to visually illustrate the model set out above, and again, only 
the primary identity, situation, and rules are included: 
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Figure 2: Shehzad Tanweer and Mohammed Siddique Khan’s Logic of Appropriateness 
 
VI. Third Case: The Jemaah Islamiyya/Imam Samudra 
The JI’s, or specifically, one of its leaders’, statements compose the next case. This 
organization, operating in Indonesia, has only one extant major statement, the justification for the 
Bali bombings by its mastermind, Imam Samudra, and published in a book called Aku Melawan 
Teroris (I Fight Terrorists) in Indonesia. I was unable to obtain a full translation of this text, and 
so I have had to work from an article
13
 which summarizes and analyzes it. The author of the 
article has his own goals and purposes in both his analysis and translation, preventing me from 
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accessing its content by itself. On account of this, I consider this only a limited analysis, and the 
conclusions are only meant to strengthen to the previous two analyses, not to stand by itself. 
Despite that limitation, the case, in conjunction with the previous one, demonstrates that the 
logic of appropriateness among terrorists is geographically widespread and not regionally 
restricted phenomenon.    
Samudra first stresses the importance of understanding the concept of jihad to understand 
why he carried out the attacks, one meaning of which is to fight against infidels occupying 
Muslim lands, or jihaad fii sabiilah. He lists the stages of jihad next. The first is to bear patience 
under abuse and oppression and pray for the forgiveness of their attackers. When this did not 
stop, they had permission to fight against them, and the last stage is the obligation to fight, 
especially when they have seized Muslim lands.  According to Samudra, this jihad will end when 
three conditions have been fulfilled: 
1. All mankind bear testimony to the unity of God and that Muhammed is his prophet 
2. There is no more ingratitude on earth. 
3. God’s religion prevails over all other religions (p. 1037). 
 
Samudra goes on to say that jihad now is a fardhu ain, or “personal obligation,” because of all 
the Muslim lands occupied by foreigners who cannot be repelled by the people living in those 
lands. All Muslims then are obligated to help (pp. 1036-1037). 
 After laying out this general framework, he specifies why the Bali bombing was justified. 
The main target of the bombing was the U.S. and its allies for attacking the helpless and innocent 
Muslims in Afghanistan, and as a result, war must be waged against them. And, because of the 
“global scale” of these attacks against Islam, Bali was a legitimate target despite not being 
against the U.S. itself.  As for the civilians killed, he views them as legitimate targets unprotected 
                                                                                                                                                             
13
 “Imam Samudra’s Justification for Bali Bombing” (Hassan  2007). All page citations in this section, unless 
otherwise noted, will refer to this article. 
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by Islam since they are guilty of supporting and paying taxes to the governments committing 
crimes against Muslims and Islam. Further, he argues that American and its allies have set a 
precedent of killing civilians by listing a number of instances (e.g. the embargo on Iraq which 
killed from 600,000 to 1.5 million children) and “it is only fair that Muslims reciprocate 
accordingly.” The Bali bombing was “a response […] to [defend] the Muslims’ self-respect” and 
part of a “jihad that must be carried out even though only a small number of Muslims participate 
in it.” For Samudra, “[t]argeting civilians is […] a matter of tipping the scale to attain 
equilibrium—blood with blood, life with life, and civilian with civilian.” He admits “that war is 
cruel and bloodcurdling, but injustice cannot be allowed to go unpunished.” The aggression of 
the U.S. and its allies “is crueler than the war being fought by the mujahidin and for this reason 
God makes war against them an obligation so that balance is attained” (pp. 1038-1040).  
 The reason why Samudra chose the Bali night-club specifically rests partially on the logic 
of consequences and partially on the logic of appropriateness. For instance, the night-club, and 
surrounding businesses, were places of “vice” and conducted business prohibited by Islam, 
therefore making them legitimate targets, and the impact on innocent businesses would be 
minimal. The night-club also provided a “homogenous” target for attack, meaning that the only 
people who would (or should) visit that place were Americans and their allies. By virtue of this, 
an attack there would maximize the amount of damage done to the offending nation, thereby 
making it both more effective (because it maximizes damage) and more appropriate (because it 
minimizes the amount of innocents harmed). Undoubtedly, I imagine at least, there were other 
material concerns guiding the JI’s choice of target, such as familiarity with the area, easier access 
to explosive materials inside Indonesia, knowledge of local language, etc., but Hassan does not 
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mention if Samudra included these reasons as well (pp. 1040-1041). Regardless, the logic of 
consequence only guided the specific form the attack took, not the reasoning to attack.  
 These selections demonstrate that Samudra’s situation, identity as a Muslim, and norms 
were the causes behind the attack, not a large payoff or strategic concerns. The situation, as he 
sees it, is that Muslims and Islam are being attacked around the world by the U.S. and its allies, 
and that the civilians of those countries support that. It is not just the attacks themselves, but also 
injustice, cruelty, and aggression against Muslims. Additionally, he has the three requirements 
that must be met, which can be thought of as a situation. The rules and norms for this situation 
are given in his explanation of jihad (which, though I did not note, are all supported by 
quotations from the Qur’an, Muslim scholars, and hadith)—all Muslims are obligated to punish 
and attack the aggressors. His emphasis on attaining equilibrium, obligation, and punishment 
point to norms, not consequences, motivating his decision to attack. That this jihad must be 
carried out even by a small number of Muslims does not appear to be a strategic choice. Here too 
Islam provides the structure and framework for Samudra to match his identity, situation, and 
rules to determine the appropriate course of action, though again I do not mean to implicate 
Islam in causing terrorism. It provided the link between his rules and norms (jihad), identity 
(Muslim), and situation (occupation of Muslim lands, injustice against Muslims), allowing him 
to match them together.  
 Figure 3 below summarizes the JI’s/Samudra’s logic of appropriateness. Note that this 
figure does not explain the choice of the Bali nightclub, simply because their logic of 
appropriateness gave a general model: 
 
Figure 3: The Jemaah Islamiyya’s/Imam Samudra’s Logic of Appropriateness 
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VII. Fourth Case: Revolutionary Organization 17 November 
 For the final case, I will analyze the court testimony of Dimitris Koufodinas, the former 
leader of the now defunct Greek terrorist group, Revolutionary Organization 17 November 
(17N). These statements are taken from another analysis, “Urban Guerrilla or Revolutionary 
Fantasist? Dimitris Koufodinas and the Revolutionary Organization 17 November,” (Kassimeris 
2004), whose author translated them from Greek. Despite this factor, many of Koufodinas’s 
statements have been reproduced in whole, and so the issue of the author’s interpretations and 
views “leaking through” is less of a concern. However, as I have not looked over the source 
documents myself, I have available only what the author has thought important, potentially not 
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including statements of importance to my analysis. Even with these limitations, the words of 
Dimitris Koufodinas show that the logic of appropriateness occurs in non-Islamic, Western 
terrorist groups and individuals—it is not exclusive to Islamic ones.  
 The first evidence that Koufodinas is acting according to normative rules and not 
consequences is his testimony, saying: 
“I won’t do what you would want me to do. I won’t even bother entering your 
logic. Our morality doesn’t accept logics of cooperation and squealing. […] This 
is my stand and will hold on to it until the end, irrespective of any personal cost” 
(pp. 22-23). 
 
He himself states that he is following a different “logic,” which here is seemingly a logic of 
appropriateness, given his mention of “morality.” The opposing logic could be either based on 
the logic of consequences or appropriateness, but there is not enough evidence to say. 
Regardless, he is choosing this course of action “irrespective of any personal cost,” so the 
ultimate material payoff is not a concern, which is vital to the logic of consequence. While this 
excerpt does not have anything to do with his terrorism per se, it does show that acting according 
to normative rules is of far greater import for Koufodinas than worrying about costs, hinting that 
this may affect his violent actions as well.  
 Kassimeris writes that “Koufodinas believed that 17N and 17N alone continued to 
represent in Greece a pure and undefiled Marxist-Leninist faith” (p. 23), suggesting that 
normative values and rules for acting appropriately were based on or derived from a “Marxist-
Leninist” ideological framework. In this way, the Marxist-Leninist “faith” would appear to play 
much the same role for 17N as Islam did for the Muslim terrorists. His identity, from 
Koufodinas’s statement that 17N “was, as the group had persistently stated from the very 
beginning, an organization of simple, popular fighters. […] [I]t came from the guts of the 
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populace” (ibid.), is that of a “simple fighter” from the “general populace,” calling to mind 
notions of the proletariat, as well as famous leftist revolutionaries such as Che Guevara.  
 More information about the identity, rules, and situations can be found in the following 
excerpts: 
“[The] CIA’s station chief was and remains the long hand of American power in 
our country. Running a 5th column of a few hundred agents positioned in 
neuralgic posts inside the government, the state bureaucracy, the Army, the 
political parties and the media, he controls and directs the political, social and 
economic life of our country in relation to the interests of the USA. 
 
[…] 
 
[T]he revolutionary left, a part of the left which believes that the present-day 
social system cannot ease the social inequalities simply because it provokes and 
accentuates them. A system that cannot solve the problem of unemployment 
simply because it creates unemployment and needs to do so. A system that 
cannot efface war and conflict simply because it feeds on both. A sys- 
tem that cannot support the equal development of all nations simply because it 
relies on the unequal treatment and exploitation of the backward, under- 
developed countries. A system that doesn’t care about the ecological damage 
that it causes on our planet. And a system that shows no respect to different 
cultures and different races simply because it obeys the God of money and 
profit” (pp. 23-24). 
 
He goes on to say that this system “couldn’t be reformed, couldn’t be democratized nor could be 
humanized: it had to be overthrown through a socialist revolution” (p. 24), that being a 
revolutionary meant “choosing to fight for the poor, the weak and the exploited” (ibid.), and 
finally that: 
“the left which 17N belonged to was the left of Lenin, Che Guevara and 
Velouchiotis
14
; to the left of the October, Spanish, Chinese and Cuban 
revolutions; to the left of the anticolonial revolutions in Algeria and Vietnam, 
the left of May’68 and November’73. To the left of urban guerrilla warfare” 
(ibid.).  
 
Kassimeris, paraphrasing Koufodinas, remarks that “American imperialism, he added, had 
brought nothing but chaos and butchery not only in Greece but in most parts of the planet” (pp. 
24-25). Kassimeris also asserts that Koufodinas “idolized [Aris Velouchiotis]” and “connect[ed] 
                                                 
14
 Aris Velouchiotis was the communist leader of the Greek People’s Liberation Army (ELAS) during World War II 
who fought against the occupying Nazis and their Greek supporters. 
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ELAS’s military aims and practices to those of 17N” (p. 25). Constructing the leftist 
revolutionary identity further, Koufodinas said that  
“[the revolutionary] has the obligation, if he is true to himself and to his ideas, to 
go all the way […] [His] life choices are actually made against his personal 
interests […][and he] tak[es] part in a struggle against protogenic violence—
violence that denies man his inner essence, dehumanizes him and ultimately 
sinks him into barbarity” (p. 28).  
 
 From all this, we can identify with more clarity to what situation, identity, and rules 17N 
had matched itself too. The situation, similar to the one of al-Qaeda and the JI, is two-fold: 
American “imperialism” is destroying Greece and controlling its government, and the Greek 
government itself (“the system”) is fatally flawed and broken, ignoring its people and 
perpetuating social, political, and economic problems. Essentially, the people of Greece are 
being oppressed by inside forces (the Greek government) and outside ones (the Americans). Its 
identity is a violent, militaristic “revolutionary left,” aligned with other famous revolutionary 
leaders and movements, especially ELAS and Velouchiotis. 17N, much like al-Qaeda, matched 
itself to multiple identities (leftist revolutionary, Greek proletariat/“non-elite” citizen) to 
determine the rules it should follow. The rules for this identity and situation are fighting “for the 
poor, the weak, and the exploited” and also repairing “the system” only by overthrowing it, for 
the revolutionary left does not believe it can be restored any other way. In the very last excerpt, 
notice the necessity Koufodinas imparts on the revolutionary’s actions—to be a revolutionary, 
one must “go all the way,” even if it is against “his personal interests.” He fights against violence 
which violates human rights (dehumanizes, denies man his inner essence), i.e. normative views.  
 There is still one more crucial part missing: the role Marxism played. It is the crux of 
17N’s logic of appropriateness, since it functions as a framework for matching together its 
situation, identity, and rules, as well partially constituting both its identity and rules. It was 
hinted at with Koufodinas’s mentioning of Che Guevara and Lenin, but becomes more apparent 
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when Kassimeris states “Koufodinas paraphrased from Karl Marx’s Das Kapital and The 
Communist Manifesto in order to rationalize 17N’s campaign of violence and argue that 
according to Marx, violence of that kind was not terrorism” (ibid.). The importance here is not 
that he defended against charges of terrorism (though that itself suggests he, and 17N, are acting 
according to different norms), but that he used Marx’s theories to do so. Marxism (and 
communism more generally) provided the structure to match and connect 17N’s situation, 
identity, and norms, all while it partially constitutes the group’s identity (communist/Marxist) 
and rules (violent revolution). In doing both those, it functions much the same as Islam did for 
the aforementioned Islamic terrorists.  
 Lastly, I wish to note that the logic of consequence is not wholly absent from 
Koufodinas’s explanation of 17N’s actions, and still accurately characterizes some of their logic. 
It is readily evident when he explains how the group went about choosing its targets and which 
ones it chose. For instance, “17N made no attempts to attack on the heart of the Greek state so 
there could be no exaggerated polarization” (p. 26) and it chose targets which would  “expose 
and de-legitimate the regime without having any negative political or material consequences for 
the workers and the mass movement” (p. 27). He also was convinced that “asymmetric guerilla 
warfare” could provide “many Vietnams [and] could prove the Achilles’ heel of this arrogant 
hyper armed empire” (p. 25). Future consequences and payoffs did affect 17N’s actions, but only 
regarding its effectiveness for fulfilling the norms the group matched with. That is, the logic of 
consequence was relevant only after the decision to use violence had been made.  
 The final figure should illustrate the differences between 17N’s logic of appropriateness 
and matching framework and those of the Islamic groups: 
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Figure 4: Revolutionary Organization 17 November’s Logic of Appropriateness 
 
VIII. Conclusion 
 This essay has argued that the logic of appropriateness can characterize parts of terrorist 
groups' decision making process which the logic of consequences cannot. From the statements 
examined, I would also argue that the group as a whole uses the logic of appropriateness, not just 
individual members. The main argument for the future inclusion of the logic of appropriateness, 
or at the very least research investigating it in greater depth, is also supported by the empirical 
tests failing to support rational model based theories—terrorists still use violence despite 
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continued failure.
15
  Understanding the role of the logic of appropriateness in determining the use 
of violence will provide fruitful answers for situations where rationality assumptions fail to 
generate answers consistent with the data, such as why “terrorists are reflexively perceived as 
politically incorrigible’” (Abrahms 2012, p. 383) by states. Following rules of appropriateness, 
which do not change with the magnitude of future payoffs, offers theoretically productive 
assumptions to solve puzzles like this.  
 Both the logic of consequences and the logic of appropriateness are necessary. Neither is 
always going to be inherently superior to the other; these assumptions are analogous to tools, and 
which one is important depends on what the researcher is trying to accomplish. Where the 
importance  of each logic lies relative to the other is unclear as of yet, but, based on the cases, it 
is after the decision to use violence has been made. Deciding which logic to assume also depends 
on how specific the rules  of the logic of appropriateness are, and so a careful study of those rules 
will be immensely helpful in choosing the most suitable tools. Future research needs to explore 
the division of logics with a finer grain to see the effects of low and high rule specificity. Further, 
the nature of the division itself is in need of description—can low specificity still act as a strict 
division, high specificity a porous one, or does it even seem like a “division” at all?  A better 
understanding will suggest which logic to use according to what facet of terrorism is being 
studied (e.g. preparations for attacks, location of attacks, methods used, etc.). In this way, both 
logics have a place in the study of terrorism, and which one is assumed will depend on the 
research question.  
 Communication has long been held to be (one of) the primary purposes of terroristic 
violence (Schmid and Graaf 1982), but the cases presented complicate this view. It appears that 
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 See “Why Terrorism Does not Work,” Abrahms, Max 2006, “The Political Effectiveness of Terrorism Revisited,” 
Abrahms, Max 2012 
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what is being communicated is not a simple issue, not to mention that our concept of 
communication may not wholly capture terroristic communication. Indeed, “the literature on 
terrorism suggests that it is a flawed coercive tactic precisely because it is a flawed 
communication strategy” (ibid., p. 382),  and so viewing this communication through the lens of 
norms may suggest an alternative to coercion. Terrorists stress the normative and humanitarian 
violations, the transgression of rights, and breaking of what they view as basic rules. Under the 
logic of consequence, the normative issues and cultural rules are lost underneath their material 
manifestations, e.g. foreign occupation of territory. Conclusions which best grasp the material 
aspect, such as coercion, are then given greater visibility and privilege. A thorough 
understanding of the logic terrorists follow can solve the coercion conundrum by unearthing 
what exactly terrorists expect from the reception of their communication and if this 
communication itself is actually normative, not strategic/coercive.  
 The normative dimensions added by the logic of appropriateness can provide a link 
between terrorist groups and peaceful ones trying to accomplish the same goals. If such a 
connection exists, a direct comparison makes possible compelling theories for explaining the 
choice of political violence among different groups by examining differences in their situation, 
identity, and rules. Some research has already suggested terrorist organizations are similar to 
transnational advocacy organizations (Asal et al., 2007) building off the work of Finnemore and 
Sikkink (1999), but unfortunately research along these lines has not progressed. A focus on the 
appropriateness-based logic of terrorism may lead to more general theories of social movements 
by providing grounds for a relationship between peaceful and violent ones, hopefully also 
showing how to prevent groups from becoming violent.     
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 Lastly, the logic of appropriateness terrorism hold great promise for policy makers and 
future policy dealing with terrorism. Of particular interest for this purpose would be research on 
how situation relates to identity and rules to produce terrorism, since the situation is the most 
likely dimension policy can directly and immediately influence. Given that meanings for 
identity, situation, and rules are common among a larger population, minimally altering a 
situation or how it is perceived so that terrorism becomes highly unlikely or impossible to arise 
might be hugely more effective than current counter-terrorist measures which focus on 
individuals and groups; the larger scale might be able to save resources while covering 
exponentially more individuals than current methods.  
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